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Abstract 
Given the rapidly increasing amount of digital crimes, network forensics plays a significant role in the process of analyzing
evidence. Current cyber crime investigation techniques are very costly and time consuming because much effort is needed to 
analyze the overwhelming amount of evidence in each case. More information is required to understand and analyze the factors 
involved in cyber crime, such as the intention of the crime. This paper proposes a new algorithm called the Similarity of Attack 
Intention (SAI), which uses cosine similarity as a distance-based similarity measure to estimate similar cyber crime intentions. 
The algorithm is based on the Attack Intention Analysis (AIA) algorithm to predict new cyber crime intentions and assigned the 
probability values for these intentions. A similarity metric for the new cyber crimes intentions with others is generated in order to 
identify the similar intentions. The evaluation of example cyber crime results shows that our proposed algorithm provides better 
solutions and increases the possibility value of evidences. 
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
The number of digital crimes nowadays is increasing. Consequently, the network forensics plays an important
role in the cyber crime analysis process. For example, big companies like Sony group and Google have been 
penetrated by a sophisticated attack by some computer hackers called themselves "Anonymous" for over a month in 
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2011. In most of these cases, it takes a lot of time to discover a real crime maker, and until this moment, some of 
them are still registered as unknown. In reality, according to 2011 Cyber Security Watch Survey [1] 21% of the 
digital crime events has been caused by “unknown”. This indicates that the current network forensics investigation 
process is time consuming, expensive, and an error-prone process is highly expected in apprehending the real 
perpetrators. 
Palmer [2] defined network forensics as: “The use of scientifically proven techniques to collect, fuse, identify, 
examine, correlate, analyze, and document digital evidence from multiple, actively processing and transmitting 
digital sources for the purpose of uncovering facts related to the planned intent, or measured success of unauthorized 
activities meant to disrupt, corrupt, and or compromise system components as well as providing information to assist 
in response to or recovery from these activities”. The ultimate goal of the network forensics is to provide sufficient 
evidence to prosecute the perpetrator of the crime as described by [2, 3].  
Recently, there are many limitations and specific research gaps related to network forensics [4-6]. Cyber crime 
analysis is considered as a major challenge for many people who are working in network forensics [5]. Therefore, 
during the investigation phase, it becomes more difficult to discover the attack and apprehend the perpetrator. 
Cyber crime analysis, especially attack intentions, supports investigators in bringing a close criminal cases with 
greater accuracy in advance to decide the suitable incident response as mentioned in [7, 8]. In addition, analyzing 
attack intentions is a necessity to produce clear evidence to accelerate the decision processes required for 
apprehending the real perpetrator.  
This paper is proposing a new algorithm to estimate the similarity of the cyber crime intentions with others for 
network forensics. This algorithm describes the similarity of attack intentions process as mentioned in [13]. The 
algorithm based on Attack Intentions Analysis (AIA) algorithm [7] to identify the intentions for the new cyber 
crime. The proposed algorithm is described in section 3, where the process model of a similarity between the 
intentions of the cyber crimes will be illustrated. The next section will present a related work of network forensics 
analysis and cyber crimes intentions. Finally, we introduce an experimental example of a cyber crime by using 
samples of probabilistic values of detection accuracy for the cyber crimes intentions to evaluate our proposed 
algorithm.  
2. Related works 
In reality, there are two main network security perspectives, 1. Prevention: such as firewalls and Intrusion 
Prevention System (IPS). 2. Detection: such as Intrusion Detection System (IDS) [2, 4, 5]. Accordingly, network 
forensics is considered an extension of network security as well as computer forensics, the last deals with laws and 
guiding principles of a judicial system. In fact, the network forensics uses scientific techniques to collect, examine, 
analyze, and document digital evidences from digital sources and network security perspectives to uncover facts 
related to the cyber crimes. Analyzing digital evidences of the cyber crimes is a actually considered a major 
challenge in network forensics [5]. 
In general, the analysis phase in network forensics approaches faces many challenges such as reconstruction 
methods of attack behavior. Normally we have to go through a full capture of malicious behavior in order to 
understand the intention of the attack. Also, the classification process and clustering of network events as mentioned 
by [4], may arise when the protocols’ complexity exist. Furthermore, reconstruction methods, which are used to 
understand the intention of the attack complicate the cyber crime analysis. 
Cyber crime analysis has emerged as a comprehensive review of intention, as mentioned in [9], where intruder 
states are combined with system states to create an intention list. Also, it is possible to estimate threats to predict 
future attacks depending on their founding intentions. According to Peng et al. [10], attack intentions are realized 
when it is able to identify the goal of this attack, which presents its path. However, a graph algorithm with methods 
for intrusive intention recognition used to analyze the attack path in advance to discover the goal of the cyber 
crimes. Even for an expert, it is difficult to find a method of intrusion [6], which makes the prediction of the attack 
goals more complicated. Hence, the attack intention as well as the attack analysis is still the main challenge in 
network forensics [4, 9, 11]. Attack intention analysis, as mentioned in [8] could produce clear evidences to help 
investigators to make the right decision. 
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Similarity measurements could improve the quality of the results of the cyber crime evidence analysis. These 
results minimize the duration time and processing cost of the made decision in the investigation phase of network 
forensics [12]. In general, most of the similarity methods are based on either distance, or feature, or probabilistic 
measurements. However, these methods are often used in the alert correlation techniques, which depends on the 
similarity of the attack attributes [11, 12]. 
Our proposed algorithm uses the probability of detection accuracy values of attack intention to estimate the 
similar intentions. The probability values are conducted from (AIA) algorithm [7], which generates a list of 
probability attack intentions depends on relevant evidences. This combines Dempster–Shafer (D-S) evidence theory 
with causal networks to get a better estimation of the attack intentions. 
3. Similarity of attack intentions algorithm 
This section describes the similarity of attack intentions process model that estimates the similar intentions 
behind new attacks. The similarity metric that measures the attack intentions is generated to determine similar 
intentions.  
 The model is divided into three subcomponents, as shown in Fig. 1. The first subcomponent identifies the attack 
intentions of the current attack based on the same previous attack intention analysis process model through the new 
AIA algorithm. The similarity metric for attack intentions is generated in the second subcomponent to determine 
similar intentions. The third subcomponent utilizes the predefined attack evidence depository, which consists of 
previous intentions. The depository is utilized to select intentions based on the similarity between the intentions of 
the new attack and the previous ones. The components are described in the succeeding subsections. 
3.1. Identification of attack Intention 
This subcomponent adopts network capturing tools such as Wireshark, and Snort, as Network Intrusion Detection 
Systems (NIDSs). Network traffic is captured in the first step through network capturing tools, which normally 
produce a huge array of alerts and security data. A copy of the captured data is analyzed in the next step to identify 
the attack alerts. Based on these alerts, the model begins to collect evidence that relates to a specific attack. All the 
possible attack intentions are defined in the result. 
3.2. Similarity metric generation for attack intentions 
The attack intention probability is computed in this subcomponent with the AIA algorithm [7]; each value is 
associated with a relevant attack type to generate a similarity metric. The model employs a similarity metric to 
approximate the attack intention and to determine the similarity of the new attack intentions with the other pre-
defined intentions.    
3.3. Selecting similar intentions 
This subcomponent selects the closest match to the intentions of the new attack. The model then utilizes a pre-
defined database that contains data on all previous attacks and their real intentions. These data are collected during 
the investigation process. 
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Fig. 1.  Similarity of attack intentions process model based on (AIA) algorithm. 
 
A new algorithm called Similarity of Attack Intentions (SAI) as shown in Fig. 2, which is based on the AIA 
algorithm and the proposed model, is designed to allow the subcomponents of the model to produce outcomes. This 
algorithm helps to better understand the logic of establishing the similarity of attack intentions process, which 
described in [13]. 
The SAI algorithm establishes the similar intentions between a new attack and previous ones. It defines a set 
named {PA}, which contains all previous attacks, where PA={A1, A2, A3, … , An} and n is the integer number. 
Another set named {AI} is defined; it contains all attack intentions for all predefined attacks, where AI={I1, I2, I3, … 
, In} and n is the integer number. One or more attack intentions from the set {AI} are relevant to one or more attacks 
from the predefined attack set {PA}, which means the relation between set {AI} and set {PA} is many-to-many. 
A probability value is assigned to each attack intention in the set {AI} with the AIA algorithm [7]. We suppose 
that a new attack called Ak which belongs to the {PA} set occurs. This attack contains a set of intentions called AkIx, 
which is a subset of {AI} and xı1. The SAI algorithm estimates the similarity values between the new attack 
intentions and the others. First, the algorithm identifies all the attacks that contain one or more of the attack 
intentions from the subset of {AkIx}. The algorithm computes the sum of all the probability values of the attack 
intentions that are relevant and similar to the Ak intentions for one attack. The similarity of attack Ak intention 
(SimAnI(Ak)) is computed as the total probability value of  the attack intentions (AnIx) divided by the total number of 
the similar intentions of a specific attack [13], as illustrated by the SAI algorithm. 
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The intentions similarity metric is generated from (SimAnI(Ak)). We select the maximum similarity of attack 
intention value from the intentions similarity metric to identify the similarity between the intention of the new attack 
AK and others; the value is computed by (SimAI(Ak)) [13], as illustrated by the SAI algorithm. 
 
Fig. 2.  Similarity of attack intentions (SAI) algorithm. 
4. Implementation of SAI algorithm  
This section introduces the SAI algorithm, which aims to implement the similarity of attack intentions process 
model based on an AIA algorithm. This algorithm presents a set of sequential operations to determine the new cyber 
crime intentions based on the predefined intentions.  
The SAI algorithm establishes similar intentions. It depends on the AIA algorithm to assign the probability ratio 
for each intention. Similar intentions are established based on the similarity of the new attack intentions with the 
predefined intentions through the average value of the same intentions for each attack with the new one. For 
example, we assume that a new attack called An has three intentions: {i1, i2, i3}. The SAI algorithm establishes a 
similar attack based on the attack intentions as shown in Table 1. 
      Table 1. Example of establishes a similar attack based on the attack intentions. 
Attack 
ID i1 i2 i3 SumSim SimA 
A1 0.23 0 0.15 0.38 0.126667 
A2 0.35 0.16 0.45 0.96 0.32 
A3 0 0 0.21 0.21 0.07 
A4 0.52 0.19 0.13 0.84 0.28 
A5 0.37 0.12 0 0.49 0.163333 
Table 1 shows that the similarity of the new attack An with others is called attack A2, which is the maximum 
similarity (SimA) value. The intention value (0) for A1i2, A3i1, A3i2, and A5i3 means that no same intentions among 
Input : Attack with their intentions probability. 
Output: Estimate similar of the new attack intentions with 
        other. 
Begin 
Let PA a set of predefined attacks {A1,A2,A3…An} 
 Define Ak as a new attack, where Ak є PA 
 Let AI a set of predefined attack intentions {i1,i2,i3…im} 
Define Ix using AIA as a set of all attack intentions for 
       Ak,  where Ix є AI 
Initialize the maximum similarity of attack intention 
           with Ak, MaxSimAI(Ak) = 0 
Initialize the summation of all similarity of attack 
           intention with Ak, SumSimAI(Ak) = 0 
For each An є PA do 
     For each Im є AI do 
         Select Id where Id є Ix 
         If Id founds, then  
           Assign AnId as the probability value of Id 
         Else  
           Assign AnId = 0 
        End If 
       Compute SumSimAI(Ak) = SumSimAI(Ak) + AnId 
    End For  
Compute SimAnI(Ak) = SumSimAI(Ak) / r, as a similar attack 
                    intention, where r is the total number of Ak intentions 
If SimAnI(Ak) > MaxSimAI(Ak ), then  
      Assign MaxSimAI(Ak) = SimAnI(Ak) 
      Select n as an a maximum similar attack number 
    End If 
    End For 
End 
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these attacks are observed for attack An. SumSim presents the summation of the similar attack intentions for each 
attack, and SimA presents the average of the similar intention values. 
5. Analyzing the experimental results 
This section evaluates the SAI algorithm, which depends on the AIA algorithm to predict new cyber crime 
intentions and assign the probability values of accuracy detection to these intentions. A similar metric for new cyber 
crime intentions is generated to identify similar intentions.  
We consider an example assumes that the new attack A11 intentions are analyzed with the AIA algorithm and 
detected as a set of four intentions: {i1, i4, i6, i2}. The potential intentions of the new cyber crime are {i1, i2}; the two 
have a maximum probability value and are reserved for the Ix set where x represents the number of intentions as 
shown in Table 2. The probability values for each intention present the accuracy of the height value of detection 
after the analysis process. Each value equals (0.68). We suppose that the predefined attack set is PA={A1, A2, A3, … 
A10}, and the predefined intention set is AI={i1, i2, i3, … i10}.  
Table 2. Intentions probability values for all attacks.  
 i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6 i7 i8 i9 i10 
A1 0.25 0 0.55 0 0.33 0 0.45 0 0 0 
A2 0.61 0.35 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 0 0 
A3 0.32 0 0 0 0 0.67 0.68 0 0 0.6 
A4 0.17 0.22 0.5 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A5 0.33 0.35 0 0 0.12 0.48 0 0 0 0.69 
A6 0.31 0 0.38 0 0.5 0 0 0 0.21 0 
A7 0.22 0 0.64 0.53 0 0.17 0.14 0.34 0 0 
A8 0.35 0.21 0 0 0 0 0.29 0 0.35 0 
A9 0 0.62 0.43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 
A10 0.02 0.56 0.47 0 0.7 0 0.68 0.13 0.19 0 
A11 0.68 0.68 0 0.17 0 0.43 0 0 0 0 
 
The SAI algorithm identifies the similar intentions {i1, i2} between the new attack A11 and previous ones as 
shown in Table 3.  
    Table 3. The similar intention values for i1 and i2. 
 
  
 
Fig. 3 shows the similarity values between each intention in attack A11 and the predefined attacks. 
 
 Similarity with (i1) 
Similarity 
with (i2) 
Similarity 
 with (i1) & (i2) 
A1 0.25 0 0.125 
A2 0.61 0.35 0.48 
A3 0.32 0 0.16 
A4 0.17 0.22 0.195 
A5 0.33 0.35 0.34 
A6 0.31 0 0.155 
A7 0.22 0 0.11 
A8 0.35 0.21 0.28 
A9 0 0.62 0.31 
A10 0.02 0.56 0.29 
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Fig. 3. Similarity relation between the intentions of A11 with other attacks. 
 
The evaluation of the results shows that the SAI algorithm provides useful information and increases the 
possibility value of evidence in advance, thereby helping investigators eliminate similar cases based on the 
similarity of intentions. The results present the relation between the new cyber crime and other crimes, which helps 
improve the decision making process. 
6. Conclusion and future work 
In this paper we proposed a new algorithm called Similarity of Attack Intention (SAI), to estimate the similar 
cyber crimes intentions. Based on (AIA) algorithm we identified the probability values of accuracy detection for the 
cyber crimes intentions. The results explained there is a relation between the new cyber crime and the pre-defined 
cyber crimes. It also, proved that the similarity measurements of the intentions help the investigators to estimate the 
similar cases of the new cyber crime with others, in order to reduce the time and processing cost.   
Attack intentions can be used as an efficient factor to identify the attack strategy in advance to increase the 
possibility value of evidence in network forensics. Moreover, the accuracy of the estimated values of the similar 
cyber crime could be increased when the Case-Based Reasoning technique is used. 
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